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CHAPTER 19 
Rent Control 
ROBERT M. BLOOM* AND MARSHALL F. NEWMAN** 
§19.1. Statutory responses to housing shor~ages. Early his-
tory. Contrary to a widely-held belief, the use of rent controls to 
ameliorate severe housing shortages is not a new phenomenon in 
Massachusetts. As early as December 12, 1919, the peneral Court, re-
sponding to the acute housing shortage brought orl by World War I, 
ordered the Commission on the Necessaries of Life to study and in-
vestigate the circumstances affecting the charges for rent of property 
used for living quarters. 1 At first, the powers of th~ Commission were 
limited to the holding of hearings and the making Of reports. In June 
1920, the Commission was further empowered to investigate all com-
plaints and to make a survey of the housing situati9n throughout the 
Commonwealth.2 ' 
The first, albeit primitive, rent control law in Massachusetts was in 
Acts of 1920, chapter 578. The Act made unenforceable in actions for 
rent all "unjust and unreasonable rents" for dwe~ling premises, ex-
cluding boarding rooms or rooms in hotels. 3 The s~tute created a re-
buttable presumption that a rental charge was unjust and unreasona-
ble if it had been increased by more than 25% over the previous 
year's charge, except in cases where unusual repa~rs and alterations 
had been made.4 Although the Act made unjust rents unenforceable, 
it did not preclude a landlord from using summary process to recover 
possession of premises from tenants who refused to pay the "unen-
forceable" rent increases. This gaping loophole undiermined the effec-
*ROBERT M. BLOOM is Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law at Boston College Law School 
and Director, Boston College Legal Assistance Bureau. The author wishes to acknowledge 
the assistance of Richard Allen, Housing Attorney, MassachusettS Law Reform Institute. 
**MARSHALL F. NEWMAN is a May, 1975 graduate of Boston College Law School. 
§19.1. 1 Acts of 1919, c. 365. The Commission was initially established only to study 
and investigate the soaring prices of commodities. Acts of 1919, c. 341. Its charge to 
study rentals was something of an afterthought. 
2 Acts of 1920, c. 628. 
3 Acts of 1920, c. 578, § 1. 
4 Id. 
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tiveness of the law during its three years of existence.5 
Federal controls-World War II. The Emergency Price Control Act of 
1942 (EPCA),6 like the earlier Massachusetts legislation, was a re-
sponse to the extraordinary circumstances brought on by a world war. 
Congress felt that the stabilization of prices and rents was necessary to 
carry on the war effort. 7 The EPCA created an Office of Price Ad-
ministration (OPA), which was empowered to designate an area as a 
"defense rental area" after consulting with state and local officials. 8 
After a locality was so designated, state and local officials were given 
sixty days in which to act on their own with regard to high rents. 9 If 
the state or local officials failed to act, the Price Administrator could 
establish as maximum rent levels those rents in effect before the war 
effort had been undertaken. 10 All counties in Massachusetts were 
eventually designated as defense rental areas with the maximum rent 
levels set at the rental charges in effect on March 1, 1942.U 
A landlord in a defense rental area, under sanction of a $5,000.00 
fine or one year imprisonment or both,t 2 was required to register with 
the local OPA office and to provide his tenants with a copy of this 
registration. 13 Whenever there was a change in tenants, the landlord 
was required to file a notice of the change, bearing the new tenant's 
signature, with the local OPA office. 14 This procedure insured that no 
new tenant would pay more than the maximum rent. If a landlord 
wanted to increase the rent, he had to petition the Area Rent Office 
and demonstrate that at least one of the several circumstances enum-
erated in the OP A Rent Regulations for Housing15 applied to the 
building in question. 
5 Although chapter 578 was originally scheduled to remain in effect for only 20 months 
(until February I, I922), id. § 3, Acts of 1921, c. 488, extended its life for an additional year, 
and Acts of I922, c. 357, § 4 extended it an additional six months (until July I, I923). 
8 Act of Jan. 30, I942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23. 
7 Id. § I(a), 56 Stat. 23-24. 
8 Id. §2(b), 56 Stat. 26 
9 Id., 56 Stat. 25. 
1o Id. 
11 All counties in Massachusetts had been declared defense rental areas by October 5, 
I942, with the exceptions of the counties of Dukes and Nantucket.Those two counties 
were brought under rent control when the Price Administrator designated as defense 
rental areas all sections of the country not previously controlled. 7 Fed. Reg. 7942 
(I942). 
12 Act of Jan. 30, I942, ch. 26, § 205(b), 56 Stat. 33. 
13 Rent Regulation for Housing§ 7(a), 8 Fed. Reg. 7345 (I943). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. § 5, 8 Fed. Reg. 734I (1943). Among the circumstances which might permit an 
increase in the maximum rent allowable were the undertaking of major capital im-
provements; an increase in the services or furnishings supplied to the building; an in-
crease in the number of occupants; or a showing that the rent in effect as of the max-
imum rent date had been based on personal or special relationships, thus causing the 
rent to be lower than the fair market value of the premises. I d. 
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The EPCA, in addition to controlling rents, also imposed a few 
rather ineffectual restraints on evictions in defense rental areas. If a 
landlord wanted to evict a tenant on one of the six ,grounds specified 
in the Regulations, 16 he merely had to give notice ~o the tenant and 
the area rent office before initiating summary prci:>cess. 17 These six 
grounds for eviction were not exclusive, however; if a landlord 
wanted to evict a tenant for other reasons and established that the 
eviction would not be inconsistent with the purposes! of the EPCA and 
the Rent Regulation for Housing, he could obtain a certificate of evic-
tion from the area rent office and then proceed in court. 18 
Federal rent control after World War II. The life of the EPCA was ex-
tended several times after the conclusion of World War 11,19 but by 
194 7 housing was one of the few sectors in the economy still subject 
to price controls. Consequently, Congress was able to give the subject 
of rent control its almost undivided attention. 20 The result of this at-
tention was the Housing and Rent Act of 1947 (the 1947 Act),21 in 
which Congress, while expressing a reluctance to continue rent con-
trols in a peacetime economy,22 concluded that the housing 
emergency brought on by the war still existed, and! that rent controls 
were needed at least for a limited time in order to fight inflation and 
to achieve rental stability. 23 
The 194 7 Act set as a maximum rent level those rents in effect on 
June 30, 194 7, the last effective date of the EPCA. 24 It also provided 
16 Id. § 6(a), 8 Fed. Reg. 7343 (1943), provided that a tenant could be evicted if (1) the 
tenant refused to execute a renewal of an existing lease; (2) the ten<j.nt refused the landlord 
access to the rental unit for purposes of inspection or of showing the accommodations to a 
prospective purchaser; (3) the tenant violated a substantial obligation of the lease or commit-
ted or permitted a nuisance or used the accommodations for an illegal or immoral purpose; 
(4) at the time the tenant's lease expired the occupants of the premises were subtenants; (5) 
the landlord in good faith intended to demolish the housing accommodations or to alter or 
remodel them in a way that could not practicably be done with the tenant in occupancy; (6) 
the landlord in good faith sought to recover possession of the housing accommodations for 
immediate use and occupancy for himself. 
17 Id. § 6(d), 8 Fed. Reg. 7344 (1943). 
18 Id. § 6(b), 8 Fed. Reg. 7344 (1943).Thecertificateofevictionwas not, of course, an order 
for eviction; it merely authorized the landlord to pursue remedies available under local law. 
19 Joint resolution of June 30, 1945, ch. 214, § 1, 59 Stat. 306, extended EPCA until June 
30, 1946; Joint Resolution of July 25, 1946, ch. 671, § 1, 60 Stat. 6~4, further extended the 
EPCA until June 30, 1947. The 25-day gap in federal rent controls !which resulted from the 
late date of renewal in 1946 was filled, in Massachusetts, by an Exectitive Order of Governor 
Maurice Tobin, who ordered that continuing effect be given to all the rules, regulations and 
orders issued by the OPA until the war was officially concluded. Mass. Exec. Order No. 93 
(July 1, 1946). 
20 See generally Willis, The Federal Housing and Rent Act of ~947, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 
1118 (1947). 
21 Act of June 30, 1947, ch. 163, 61 Stat. 193. 
22 I d. § 201 (a), 61 Stat. 196. 
23 Id. § 201(b), 61 Stat. 196. 
24 Id. § 204(b), 61 Stat. 198. The 1947 Act, unlike the EPCA, excluded from federal 
control all hotel, motel, and newly-constructed units. Id. § 202(c), 61 Stat. 197. 
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a civil remedy for those tenants whose landlords collected or attempt-
ed to collect rents above the legal limits. 25 The eviction provisions of 
the 194 7 Act differed greatly from those of the EPCA. The EPCA did 
not set out specific grounds on which landlords might evict tenants. 
Instead, it delegated to the OP A a broad power to regulate "renting 
or leasing practices (including practices relating to recovery of the 
possession) in connection with any defense-area housing accommoda-
tions" which were likely to result in rent increases inconsistent with 
the purpose of the EPCA.26 The 1947 Act, on the other hand, pro-
vided that tenants might be evicted only on one or more of the five 
grounds enumerated in the ActP 
The Housing and Rent Act of 1948 (the 1948 Act)28 extended the 
194 7 Act to March 31, 1949.29 One of the few substantive additions of 
the 1948 Act was a sixty-day written notice requirement to a tenant 
before he could be subject to eviction proceedings. 30 
The Housing and Rent Act of 1949 (the 1949 Act)31 further ex-
tended the 1947 Act to June 30, 195032 and added several important 
features to the federal rent control scheme. It made the adjustment of 
rent contingent upon the landlord's certifying that he was maintain-
ing and would continue to maintain all services furnished as of the 
date determining the maximum rent. 33 It set maximum rent, for the 
first time, at a level that would give the landlord a "fair net operating 
income," as defined by the Act.34 The 1949 Act also eliminated the 
25 Id. § 205,61 Stat. 199. A landlord who demanded, accepted or received rent in excess of 
the maximum levels was liable to the tenant for reasonable attorney's fees, court costs and 
liquidated damages in the amount of the greater of either $50 or three times the amount by 
which the payment demanded, accepted or received exceeded the lawful maximum rent. I d. 
26 Act of Jan. 30, 1942, ch. 26, § 2(d), 56 Stat. 26. See note 16 supra. 
27 Under the 194 7 Act, a tenant could be evicted if (1) under state law the tenant violated 
the "obligation of his tenancy" or committed a nuisance or used the accommodations for an 
"immoral or illegal purpose or for other than living or dwelling purposes;" (2) the landlord 
sought in good faith to recover possession for his immediate and personal use and occu-
pancy; (3) the landlord in good faith sought to substantially alter or remodel the housing 
accommodations or to demolish them and replace them with new construction, which work 
could not practically be done with the tenant in occupancy, and which plans had obtained the 
necessary approval under federal, state or local law; (4) the landlord had contracted in good 
faith to sell the housing accommodations to a purchaser for the purchaser's immediate 
personal use and occupancy; or (5) the housing accommodations were located within a single 
dwelling unit not used as a rooming or boarding house, the remaining portion of which was 
occupied by the landlord or his family. Act of June 30, 194 7, ch. 163, § 209(a), 61 Stat. 200. 
Compare id.with Rent Regulation for Housing§ 6(a), summarized in note 16 supra. 
28 Housing and Rent Act of 1948, ch. 161, 62 Stat. 93. 
29 Id. § 202(a), 62 Stat. 94. 
30 Id. § 204(e), 62 Stat. 99. 
31 Housing and Rent Act of 1949, ch. 42, 63 Stat. 18. 
32 Id. § 203(a), 63 Stat. 21. 
33 Id. § 203(b), 63 Stat. 21. 
34 Id., which read in pertinent part: 
In determining whether the maximum rent ... yields a fair net operating income ... , 
due consideration shall be given to the following, among other relevant factors: (A) 
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five statutorily specified grounds of eviction of the 1947 Act, and in-
stead delegated to the Housing Expediter the samt1 power that had 
previously been delegated to the OPA to regulate ~·speculative" and 
"manipulative" leasing practices. 35 Finally, the 1949 !Act provided for 
the termination of federal rent controls in each state or locality that 
either enacted its own rent control laws or declared by law that fed-
eral rent control was no longer necessary because the shortage of ren-
tal housing had abated. 36 
The 1947 Act was further continued by the Housing and Rent Act 
of 1950,37 the Defense Production Act Amendments of 195 !38 and 
1952,39 and the Housing and Rent Act of 1953.40 ~oth the Housing 
and Rent Act of 195041 and the Defense Production Act Amendments 
of 195242 provided for a later termination of federal icontrol if a local-
ity, by resolution or referendum, concluded that a substantial shortage 
of housing still existed in its area and that federal controls should 
therefore continue. Referendums held in Massachus¢tts43 clearly indi-
cated that most of its cities and towns were overwhelmingly in favor 
of rent control. 44 
Massachusetts legislation. During the late 1940's sev¢ral bills were in-
troduced in the General Court to insure the continuation of rent 
controls.45 The repeated renewals of federal controls, however, made 
action on these bills unnecessary. When it became cl~ar, in 1953, that 
Congress would no longer continue the federal controls, 46 the Mas-
sachusetts legislature finally acted. 
Chapter 434 of the Acts of 1953 provided that aiJ!y city or town in 
which federal rent control existed as of the date of! the Act (june 2, 
Increases in property taxes; (B) unavoidable increases in operatin~ and maintenance 
expenses; (C) major capital improvement of the housing accomi;hodations as distin-
guished from ordinary repair, replacement, and maintenance; (!I>) increases or de-
creases in living space, services, furniture, furnishings, or equipm~nt; and(E)substan-
tial deterioration of the housing accommodations, other than ordittary wear and tear, 
or failure to perform ordinary repair, replacement, or maintenaj:lce. 
35 Id. § 206, 63 Stat. 29. 1 
38 Id. § 203(h), 63 Stat. 26-27. 
37 Housing and Rent Act of 1950, ch. 354, § 2, 64 Stat. 255. 
38 Defense Production Act Amendments of 1951, ch. 275, § 2II,i65 Stat. 149. 
39 Defense Production Act Amendments of 1952, ch. 530, § 20 I ()l.). 66 Stat. 306. 
40 Housing and Rent Act of 1953, ch. 31, § 2, 67 Stat. 24. 
41 Housing and Rent Act of 1950, ch. 354, § 4, 64 Stat. 255. • 
42 Defense Production Act Amendments of 1952, ch. 530, § 201(~). 66 Stat. 306. 
43 Referendums to determine whether localities desired federal ren~ controls to remain in 
effect were authorized by Acts of 1950, c. 752; Acts of 1952, c. 62d. 
44 See 1959 Election Statistics, The Commonwealth of Massachusetlis, Pub. Doc. No. 43, at 
359-61. 
45 See, e.g., Mass. S. 273 (1948); Mass. S. 374 (1947); Mass. S. 314 (l947); Mass. H.R. 250 
(1947). 
48 The last extension of the Housing and Rent Act of 194 7 was sche<l.uled to expire on July 
31, 1953. Housing and Rent Act of 1953, ch. 31, § 2, 67 Stat. 24. 
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1953), could, by a vote of the appropriate local body, establish con-
trols under the newly enacted state provisions until June 30, 1954.47 
If a locality failed to hold a referendum, or if a referendum were 
held and the continuation of rent controls was rejected, rent controls 
in that locality would expire on july 31, 1953, the last effective date of 
federal controls. Twenty-eight cities and forty-five towns chose to 
adopt the state scheme.48 These localities accounted for at least 83.4% 
of the Commonwealth's apartment dwellings in buildings of three or 
more units, 89.1% of the Commonwealth's dwelling units in buildings 
of five or more units, and 65% of the Commonwealth's two-family 
dwelling units. 49 
The provisions of chapter 434 were similar to the basic provisions 
of the Housing and Rent Act of 194 7 and its later amendments. All 
dwelling units were subject to control except for hotels, motor courts, 
trailer parks, and most units built or converted to housing purposes 
after February 1, 194 7. 50 The controls were to be administered by a 
rent board of at least five members, a majority of whom were to be 
representatives of the "public interest," with the remainder equally 
representative of landlords and tenantsY Maximum rents were to be 
set at the low levels established by the federal government with due 
consideration given to a fair net operating income and with all up-
ward adjustments contingent upon the maintenance of services.52 The 
board could exempt any class of housing accommodation from max-
imum rent if, in its judgment, the need for such maximum rents no 
longer existed. 53 Any party aggrieved by an action of the board could 
file a complaint in the local district court. 54 
A landlord who charged more than the maximum rent level was li-
able to the tenant for the greater of either liquidated damages of $50 
47 Acts of 1953, c. 434, § 12. The Act, as clarified by Acts of 1954, c. 496, allowed a locality 
which had adopted the state rent controls to hold a second referendum to extend the life of 
the controls an additional nine months. Acts of 1955, c. 255, § 1 extended the state controls 
for an additional month in any locality which had, by a second referendum, extended the 
provision of the 1953 Act; § 2 of c. 225 allowed a city or town to extend rent control an 
additional eight months until December 31, 1955, by vote of the city or town council, but this 
additional extension could be rescinded by local referendum. 
48 The Community Research and Publications Group, Less Rent More Control: A 
Tenants' Guide to Rent Control in Massachusetts 4 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Less 
Rent More Control]. 
49 Report of the Special Committee Established to Investigate and Study the Subject of 
Rental Rates Currently Being Charged for Dwelling Apartments in the Commonwealth. 
Mass. H.R. Doc. No. 2575, at 12 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Report of Committee on Rental 
Rates.]. 
50 Acts of 1953, c. 434, § 2. 
51 Id. § 4. 
52 Id. § 5(a). The formula for determining a landlord's fair net operating income was 
adopted verbatim from the Housing and Rent Act of 1949. See note 34 supra. 
53 Acts of 1953, c. 434, § 5(b). 
54 Id. § 6. 
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or three times the amount by which the charged rent exceeded the al-
lowable limits, plus court fees and costs.55 In addition, violators were 
subject to criminal penalties of $500 or imprisonment for not more 
than 90 days, or both.56 Certificates of eviction prior to the initiation 
of an action for summary process were not required, although the 
grounds on which such process would be granted were limited. 57 
State controls were allowed to expire two and a half years after they 
were created.58 Not unexpectedly, decontrol triggered steep rent in-
creases throughout the Commonwealth. A blue-ribbon panel created 
by the General Court59 found that in the year following the expira-
tion of rent control rents had increased an average: of 9.2% through-
out the state, with increases in some areas well in exicess of the overall 
average.60 The panel concluded that a housing shdrtage still existed, 
and it recommended that legislation be passed to enable hard-hit 
communities to re-establish local rent controls. 61 This recommenda-
tion, however, was not acted upon. Ignoring the existence of a hous-
ing shortage did nothing to ameliorate the situation. For example, 
from 1960 to 1970, rents in Boston increased by '63%62 while total 
housing units decreased during the same period by 6,354.63 
Current rent control legislation. In 1969, the Massachusetts General 
Court, finally responding to the skyrocketing rents brought about by 
the general shortage of housing, enacted enabling legislation which 
empowered the Boston City Council, with the approval of the mayor, 
to appoint a rent board charged with the responsib~lity of controlling 
rents in residential properties having four or more units.64 The gen-
55 Id. §7(a). 
56 Id. §8(b). 
57 Id. § 10. The grounds for eviction were substantially the same as those of the OPA 
Rent Regulation for Housing § 6(a), supra note 16, with two' exceptions: the OPA 
ground of a tenant's refusal to execute a renewal of an existing lease was eliminated 
and a new ground was added, viz., when a landlord is a nonprofit religious, charitable, 
or educational institution and seeks in good faith to recover possession for the purpose 
of housing its staff members. 
58 See Message of Governor Christian A. Herter to Senate and Hduse of Representatives, 
March 25, 1955,Journal of the House of Representatives 915-16 (1955), in which Governor 
Herter urged the end of rent control, arguing that such measures had been enacted in 
response to the economic dislocations brought on by war and were no longer necessary in a 
peacetime economy. ld. 
59 Mass. S. Order No. 830, Oct. 4, 1956, Journal of the Senate, 1676 (1956), created a 
Special Committee on Rental Rates for Dwelling Apartments. T~e Committee was au-
thorized to conduct a comparative investigation of rental rates' as th~y existed in 1956 and as 
they had existed under rent control on Dec. 31, 1955. The purpose bf the investigation was 
to determine whether an emergency existed requiring the reimposition of rent control. 
60 Report of Committee on Rental Rates, supra note 49, at 4. 
61 Id. at 5. 
62 Less Rent More Control, supra note 48, at 106. 
63 This figure is derived from U.S. Census, General Housing Characteristics for Mas-
sachusetts, Table 12 (1960), and U.S. Census, General Housing Characteristics for Mas-
sachusetts, Table 1 (1970). 
64 Acts of 1969, c. 797. 
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eral aim of the legislation was to freeze rents at their December 1, 
1968 level, although higher rental charges were permitted in order to 
remove hardships or prevent inequity. 65 The town of Brookline also 
adopted a by-law in 1969 establishing rent control, but without the 
benefit of enabling legislation. 66 This latter attempt to control rent 
failed; the operation of the Brookline plan was enjoined and declared 
invalid by the Supreme Judicial Court on the ground that it violated 
the Massachusetts constitutional proscription of municipal legislative 
action governing civil relationships. 67 
In 1970, the present structure of Massachusetts rent control was 
implemented. Enabling legislation, chapter 842 of the Acts of 1970, 
was passed which allowed all cities and those towns whose population 
exceeded 50,000 to adopt rent control mechanisms. 68 Chapter 842 
empowers each locality to make its own determination as to the de-
sirability of imposing rent control; if a locality then elects to control 
rents, the extent of coverage is limited and defined by the express 
provisions of the enabling legislation. The special enabling legislation 
for Boston was revised in 1970 in order to more closely parallel chap-
ter 842.69 The legislature in 1970 also passed enabling legislation giv-
ing to Brookline rent control powers tailored to that town's particular 
needs. 70 Generally, however, the workings of rent control are uni-
65 ld. 
66 Brookline, Mass. By-Laws, Art. XXV (entitled "Unfair and Unreasonable Rental 
Practices in Housing Accommodations")( 1969). 
67 Marshal House, Inc. v. Rent Review & Grievance Bd. of Brookline, 357 Mass. 709, 260 
N .E.2d 200 ( 1970). The "Horne Rule Amendment" to the Constitution of the Common-
wealth reserves to the cities and towns the right of self-government on local matters. Mass. 
Const. amend. art. LXXXIX,§ 1. However, local authorities may not enact "private or civil 
law governing civil relationships except as an incident to an exercise of an independent 
municipal power." Id. § 7(5). Finding no independent municipal power, the Court in 
Marshal House determined that the by-law was thus invalid. 357 Mass. at 719, 260 N.E.2d at 
207. 
68 Acts of 1970, c. 842. 
69 Acts ofl970, c. 863, amending Actsofl969, c. 797. The Boston enabling legislation, 
Acts of 1969, c. 797, was adopted by the Boston City Council in Ordinances of 1969, c. 1 0; 
the amendments set out in Acts of 1970, c. 863 were similarly adopted by Ordinances of 
1970, c. 11. However, these ordinances expired at the end of 1972, and the City Council 
voted on November 27, 1972 to adopt the more expansive and procedurally fairer chapter 
842, the general enabling statute, which is available to all cities of the Commonwealth. 
Nevertheless, Boston utilizes its special enabling legislation to extend coverage to include 
FHA units, housing which is arguably exempt under the general statute. See Ordinances of 
1972, c. 19. Thus, Boston now operates under the directives of the general enabling statute, 
except that its FHA housing is controlled under Acts of 1969, c. 797, as amended by Acts of 
1970, c. 863. 
70 Acts of 1970, c. 843, as amended by Acts of 1971, c. 673. See Marshal House, Inc. v. Rent 
Control Bd. of Brookline, 358 Mass. 686,697-99, 266 N.E.2d 876,884-85 (1971), which 
sustained the validity of the special Brookline enabling legislation in the face of a constitu-
tional attack grounded on equal protection claims. See discussion in § 19.2 at n.33 infra. 
Brookline, for the most part, operates under the general enabling statute, but it has 
attempted to utilize its own special enabling statute to limit the scope of the general statute's 
8
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formly governed by the procedures set out in chap~er 842. 
All rental units are covered by the general statute except units in 
hotels and motels catering to transient guests; uq.its constructed or 
converted to housing use on or after January 1, 1~69; units in which 
a government agency or authority owns, operate~. or regulates the 
rents other than under the provision of the ren~ control act; units 
which are subsidized or financed by a governmentail agency where the 
imposition of rent control would result in the loss :of those subsidies; 
owner-occupied two and three-family dwelling~; rental units in 
cooperatives and those maintained for charitable dr educational pur-
poses; and luxury units exempted by the municipa~ity. 71 The scope of 
the latter exemption is left to local determination ill the sense that the 
local authority can define the rental value which i constitutes luxury 
housing; such units will be excluded from the openhion of the statute. 
However, at no time can a locality formulate a d~finition of luxury 
housing which will cause 25 per cent or more of the total housing 
stock to be exempted. 72 The Brookline enabling legislation contained 
no such enumeration of exempt units; instead, the local regulatory 
authority is empowered to define the limits of the town's 
exemptions. 73 Both Boston and Brookline have ahempted to utilize 
their own special enabling legislation to control ren.ts in FHA units, a 
power seemingly not granted under chapter 842. 74 
When a locality accepts rent control, it has the pption of charging 
either a single administrator or a board with the operation of the 
program. 75 Such director(s) are appointed by the mayor or city man-
ager in cities and by the board of selectmen in the eligible towns, and 
serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. 16 The rent control 
board or administrator is vested with broad responsibilities including 
the power: to promulgate rules and regulations fori the furtherance of 
the provisions of the act; 77 to recommend to th¢ city or town the 
enactment of certain by-laws for the purpose of ¢omplementing the 
statutory scheme; 78 to hire necessary personnel, and to hold hearings 
I 
exemptions. See Cambridge Tenants Organizing Committee, Tejlants Handbook: Legal 
Tactics 86 n.32 (2d ed. 1973). 
71 Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 3. Compare these exemptions to those cqntained in Acts of 1953, 
c. 434, § 2, set out in text at note 50 supra. 
72 Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 3(b)(7). 
73 See Acts of 1970, c. 843, as amended by Acts of 1971, c. 67~. 
74 See notes 69, 70 supra. For a discussion of the FHA housing ex~mption, see§ 19.3 infra. 
75 Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 5(a). G.L. c. 4, § 4 provides that acceptan e of a statute shall be by 
vote of the city council in cities and by town meetings in towns. his process is markedly 
different from that authorized by Acts of 1953, c. 434, § 12, w ich allowed for a local 
referendum. See text at note 47 supra. Moreover, under the prese*t legislation, there is no 
directive as to what interests shall be represented on the administrative body. Cf. Acts of 
1953, c. 434, § 4. See text at note 51 supra. 
78 Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 5(a). 
77 Id. § 5(c). 
78 Id. 
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and conduct investigations as required for the promulgation of regu-
lations or the formulation of orders. 79 
Rents are generally set at the rental charge levied by the landlord 
six months prior to the adoption of rent control by the locality. 80 This 
rent ceiling may be removed for any class of units having common 
characteristics, rents, or locations by the local rent authority if it is de-
cided that, as a result of sufficient construction of new rental units, 
the rental levels for the new units are comparable to the rental levels 
of the controlled class. 81 The local authority is also empowered to 
make across-the-board adjustments for any class of rental units.82 
Either action must be preceded by a hearing. 83 
The bulk of decisions of the local rental authority involve two basic 
functions. First, the authority is charged with determining whether 
individual rent adjustments shall be made.84 Requests for such ad-
justments may be made by either landlord or tenant, or on the 
authority's own initiative.85 The decision concerning the adjustment is 
based upon a determination of the rent necessary to afford the land-
lord a "fair net operating income."86 Additionally, the statute directs 
the authority to use six factors which affect the value of the rental 
unit, 87 and any other factors which the authority "by regulation may 
define."88 The second major function of the local board or adminis-
trator is the issuance of certificates of eviction; a landlord can not re-
cover possession of a controlled rental unit unless he has first ob-
tained such a certificate.89 The landlord must demonstrate that his 
79 Id. § 5(d). 
80 I d. § 6(a). Boston's initial rent level was set at the rental charged on December 1, 1968. 
See Acts of 1969, c. 797. The six-month roll-back provision of c. 842 introduces much 
needed flexibility into the establishment of initial rental levels. Cf. Emergency Price Control 
Act of 1942, ch. 26, § 2(b), 56 Stat. 25; Acts of 1953, c. 434, § 5(a). See text at notes 10, 52 
supra. 
81 Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 7(e). Compare Acts of 1953, c. 434, § 5(b), discussed in text at note 
53 supra. 
82 Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 8(b). 
83 ld. §§ 7(e), 8(b). 
84 ld. § 7(a). 
80 Id. § 8(a). 
88 Id. § 7(b). See § 19.4 infra. 
87 Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 7(b). The six factors which must be considered in determin-
ing maximum allowable rent are: (1) increases or decreases in property taxes; (2) una-
voidable increase or decrease in operating or maintenance expenses; (3) capital im-
provement as distinguished from ordinary repairs; (4) increase or decrease in living 
space, services, furniture, furnishings or equipment; (5) substantial deterioration other 
than as a result of ordinary wear and tear; and (6) failure to perform ordinary repair 
and maintenance. ld. Compare id. with Acts of 1953, c. 434, §5(a) and the Housing and 
Rent Act of 1949, ch. 42, § 203(b), 63 Stat. 21, quoted in note 34 supra. The identical 
language is employed in all three statutes. For a further discussion of "fair net operat-
ing income," see generally § 19.4 infra. 
88 Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 7(b). 
89 Id. § 9(a). See generally § 19.5 infra. 
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reasons for seeking eviction fall within one of the ten grounds enum-
erated by the statute.90 The tenant must receive notice of the 
landlord's application for the certificate and is allowed to contest its 
issuance. 91 
Any action by a board or an administrator, whetht;r it be the setting 
of maximum rents or the issuing of a certificate of eviction, is subject 
to review in the district court having territorial jurfsdiction over the 
locus of the controlled rental unit. 92 Criminal and ¢ivil sanctions are 
available against one who demands or receives any ~ental in excess of 
the maximum lawful rent,93 and criminal penalties! may be imposed 
against one who willfully violates a provision of the Act. 94 
The enabling legislation originally was to terminate on April 1, 
1975, but it has since been extended to December 31, 1975.95 As of 
this writing, only four cities and one town have adopted the rent con-
trol apparatus, despite the fact that the option remains for at least 38 
other localities to control rents. 96 
§19.2. Constitutionality of rent control. Due to the newness of 
90 Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 9(a). The ten grounds for determining whether the certificate of 
eviction should issue are: (I) tenant's failure to pay rent; (2) tenant's qontinued violation of a 
covenant of his tenancy after having received notice to cure saidi violation; (3) tenant's 
responsibility for creating a nuisance or causing substantial damage or interfering with 
comfort, safety, or enjoyment of landlord or neighbors; (4) tenant's conviction of using 
premises for illegal purposes; (5) tenant's refusal to renew lease; (6) tenant's refusal of 
reasonable access to landlord for purposes of repairs, inspection or showing to prospective 
purchaser; (7) subtenant not approved by landlord holding apartment at end of lease; (8) 
landlord seeks to use apartment for himself or others in his immediate family; (9) landlord 
seeks to demolish or otherwise remove unit from housing use; (10) any other cause not 
inconsistent with the Act. I d. Compare these grounds under c. 842 with statutory grounds 
for eviction under: the EPCA, setout at note 16supra; the Housing and Rent Act of 1947, set 
out at note 27 supra; and the restrictions on grounds for summary, process under Acts of 
1953, c. 434, § 10, set out at note 57 supra. Again, the provisions are almost identical. 
91 Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 9(b). 
92 Id. § 10. 
93 I d.§§ 11, 12. Civil penalties include liability for reasonable attonney's fees and costs as 
determined by the court, plus liquidated damages in the amount of one hundred dollars or 
not more than three times the amount by which the payment or payments demanded, 
accepted, received or retained exceed the maximum rent, whichever is greater, provided 
that if the defendant proves that the violation was neither willful nor the result of failure to 
take practicable precautions against the occurrence of the violation, the liquidated damages 
shall be the amount of the overcharge. I d.§ 11. Note the similarity to Acts of 1953, c. 434, § 7 
and the Housing and Rent Act of 194 7. See note & text at note 25 supra. Criminal penalties 
include a fine of not more than $500 or imprisonment for not more tiian 90 days or both for 
a first offense and a fine of not more than $3000 or imprisonment for not more than one 
year or both for a second or subsequent offense. Acts of 1970, c. 842,' §§ 12(a)-(c). Compare 
these criminal penalties with the criminal sanctions under Acts of 1953, c. 434, § 8(b), set 
out in text at note 56 supra. 
94 Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 12(c). The penalty is set out in note 93 isupra. 
95 Acts of 1974, c. 360. 
96 Only the cities of Boston, Cambridge, Somerville, and Lynn and the Town of Brookline 
have adopted rent control. In toto, 39 cities and 4 towns have the option of bringing 
themselves within the purview of the Act. 
11
Bloom and Newman: Chapter 19: Rent Control
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1974
§19.2 RENT CONTROL 513 
the present rent and eviction control legislation, there is a relative 
dearth of case law which might elucidate the various provisions of the 
act. This section will examine those few decisions which have ad-
dressed the questions of the constitutionality of the act and the scope 
of its exemptions and will then scrutinize the substantive and pro-
cedural aspects of the statutory formulae for the granting of rent ad-
justments and certificates of eviction. 
The Supreme Court of the United States first considered the con-
stitutionality of rent control statutes in 1921. The Court had before it 
two cases, one attacking the validity of federal legislation, the other 
challenging New York's rent control law. In Block v. Hirsh,! the Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit had held unconstitu-
tional a provision of the District of Columbia Rents Act2 which al-
lowed a tenant to hold over notwithstanding the expiration of his 
term so long as he complied with the other conditions fixed by his 
lease and the rent control commission.3 The District of Columbia Cir-
cuit found that application of the provisions served to divest the land-
lord of his right to a reversion in property without due process of 
law. 4 Finding the entire act incapable of withstanding constitutional 
scrutiny, the court emphasized that the renting of property is a pri-
vate business, and that a private business can not be made a public 
one by mere legislative fiat: "A public interest cannot be thus created, 
or property rights be divested, by an arbitrary exercise of the police 
power."5 The court conceded that Congress, through the exercise of 
its power of eminent domain, could designate the public use for 
which private property could be taken. Nevertheless, it refused to up-
hold the constitutionality of the rent control statutes on that basis, 
since those statutes contemplated the taking of private property for a 
purely private use. 6 
In reversing the circuit court's decision, the Supreme Court rejected 
the notion that a legislative enactment could not be characterized as 
having been instituted for the public welfare if it incidentally confers 
a private benefit. The Court emphasized that there are two legitimate 
courses of action which a government may take to adjust rights in 
property for the public good: the exercise of eminent domain, which 
results in a complete divesting of private rights for which the party so 
divested is justly compensated, and the exercise of the police power, 
which ultimates merely in a modification of private rights for which 
§19.2. 1 256 u.s. 135 (1921). 
2 The Food Control and District of Columbia Rents Act, ch. 80, §§ 101-22, 41 Stat. 
297, 298-304 (1919). 
3 Id. § 109, 41 Stat. 301. 
4 Hirsh v. Block, 267 F. 614,619 (D.C. Cir. 1920). 
5 ld. at 620. 
6 ld. at 622. 
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no compensation is necessary. The Court went on W say that the pri-
vate housing market, since it involves the distributiort of a necessity of 
life inaccessible to some because of its high costs, i~ affected with a 
"public interest" which justifies some degree of govtjrnmental control 
over the private interest in rentals. 7 I 
It remained to be determined whether the District bf Columbia rent 
control law was an excessive response to the admitteq "public interest" 
involved such that it rose to the level of taking of property without 
due process of law. The Court found that althougq the statute pre-
vented landlords from realizing potentially high proflts from the large 
influx of people into Washington to participate in tJte war effort, the 
statute nevertheless provided that the landlords were to receive a 
reasonable rent. 8 The Court analogized the legisla~ive guarantee of 
reasonable but not excessive rents to usury laws which allow money 
lenders a reasonable but not excessive profit from tJieir activities, and 
concluded that the restrictions imposed upon profits from rent vio-
lated no right of due process. 9 · 
In a companion case, Marcus Brown Holding Co. !I'· Feldman, 10 the 
New York rent control scheme11 was challenged by a landlord whose 
tenant was holding over under the authority of the s~atute. Unlike the 
landlord in Block, the plaintiff here, prior to the enactment of rent 
control, had leased the property to a third party whose term was to 
begin after the tenant-defendant's lease expired. Th~ landlord sought 
to evict the holdover tenant, and, in addition, to enjqin the state from 
imposing criminal sanctions on him for refusing to 
1
furnish the hold-
over heat, light, and water, as required by the terrhs of the already 
7 256 U.S. at 155-56. As examples of restrictions upon property rights which do not 
require compensation, the Court cited limitations placed upon the height of billboards 
erected on private property, Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909);1requirements for the 
erection of safe pillars in coal mines, Plymouth Coal Co. v. Penns~lvania, 232 U.S. 531 
(1914); requirements that watersheds be kept clear, Perley v. North Carolina, 249 U.S. 
510 (1919). 256 U.S. at 156. 
8 256 U.S. at 157. The statute provided that "all rents and charges ... shall be fair 
and reasonable .... "Food Control and District of Columbia Rents Act, Ch. 80, § 106, 
41 Stat. 300 (1919). This section also provided that any landlord or tenant who believed 
a rental fee to be "unfair or unreasonable" could file a complai9t with the District of 
Columbia Rent Commission and have the Commission make a ~etermination of the 
fairness and reasonableness of the rental fee. I d. · 
9 256 U.S. at 157. The Court also rejected the landlord's conte~tion that he was de-
prived of a trial by jury on the question of possession. The Court answered this objec-
tion by pointing out that having already found valid the delegati<(>n to the Rent Com-
mission to regulate the relationship between landlord and tenan~, it was impossible to 
separate the regulation of that relationship from the deciding of f~cts affecting the rela-
tionship; therefore the suspension of the ordinary remedies was <!. reasonable part of a 
statute that was itself "reasonable in its aim and intent." ld. at 158. 
10 256 u.s. 170 (1921). 
11 Laws of Sept. 27, 1920, cc. 942-47, [1920] N.Y. Laws 2477-85. 
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expired lease. He argued that the statute's restriction of grounds for 
eviction to certain just causes (not including expiration of the tenant's 
lease) not only constituted a taking of property without due process of 
law but also unconstitutionally resulted in impairment of the obliga-
tion of contracts: 12 the statute discharged the obligation of the tenant 
to surrender possession of the premises at the expiration of the term 
specified in the lease; extended all of the lessor's obligations so long 
as the tenant chose ,to remain in possession; and prevented the lessor 
from performing his obligation under the second lease, which had 
been entered into before the enactment of the law. The Court re-
jected this contention by indicating that contracts are made subject to 
the valid exercise of the police power. 13 Relying upon the reasoning of 
Block, the Court found the state rent control law to be a valid exercise 
of that power. 14 
In general, the federal judiciary has been ready to uphold the con-
stitutionality of rent control statutes as valid exercises of the police 
power whenever the controls appear to be a response to a thoroughly 
researched legislative determination that a housing crisis exists. 15 A 
recent statement by the Second Circuit indicates that the renting of 
low and moderate-income housing will no longer be considered a 
purely private matter so long as a shortage of such units continues: 
While in those [earlier] cases the Court naturally stressed the war 
and post-war emergencies, we have no doubt that it would sustain 
the validity of rent control today .... The time when extraordi-
narily exigent circumstances were required to justify price control 
outside the traditional public utilities area [has] passed .... 16 
In Russell v. Treasurer & Receiver General, 17 the Massachusetts Su-
12 "No State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts .... " 
U.S. Const. art. I, § 10. 
13 256 U.S. at 198. 
14 Id. The landlord also argued that for the Court to sanction the holding-over by the 
tenant would amount to the landlord being impressed with an involuntary servitude 
violative of the Thirteenth Amendment. The Court found that the services here in-
volved were non-personal, and were instead "analogous to services that in the old law 
might issue out of or be attached to land" and therefore did not infringe the Thir-
teenth Amendment. Id. at 199. 
15 See, e.g., Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242 (1922); Eisen v. East-
man, 421 F.2d 560, (2d Cir. 1969); Israel v. City Rent & Rehab. Adm'n of City of New 
York, 285 F. Supp. 908 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
16 Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 567 (2d Cir. 1969). The Second Circuit viewed the 
holding of the Supreme Court in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), as putting 
to rest the notion that only the most pressing national emergencies provide sufficient 
grounds for governmental price controls. 421 F.2d at 567. In Nebbia, a statute regulat-
ing the price of milk was held not to violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment on the ground that state regulation of retail prices was necessary to assure 
an available supply of milk to the public. 291 U.S. at 53 7. 
17 331 Mass. 501, 120 N.E.2d 388 (1954). 
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preme Judicial Court entertained an attack upon the validity of a 
Massachusetts rent control statute18 which has since expired. 19 
Petitioners sought to restrain the Commonwealth from reimbursing 
cities and towns for a part of the administrative expenses incurred in 
the implementation of rent control, as provided for by the act. 20 The 
prayer for relief was grounded on the alleged unconstitutionality of 
certain provisions of the act, particularly the section which exempted 
from control recently constructed units, vacant units, and luxury 
housing. 21 Such exemptions, it was argued, were atbitrary and ineq-
uitable, and deprived the owners of controlled uni~ of due process 
and of the equal protection of the law. The Court found the act to be 
a valid exercise of the state's police power, 22 and, further, that the ex-
emptions were by no means arbitrary, since they were reasonably re-
lated to the general purpose of the legislation, namely, the abatement 
of a housing shortage.23 The exemption of newly-constructed units 
was necessary to encourage the building of sorely needed housing 
while the exemption of luxury units was found to be logical since 
there was no shortage of high rent accommodations;24 The exemption 
of vacant units was upheld on the ground that it ctonstituted a valid 
first step toward the ultimate decontrol of all rents. 2$ 
The constitutionality of general provisions of the ,present rent con-
trol scheme26 was challenged in Marshal House, Int. v. Rent Control 
Board of Brookline. 27 Marshal House involved several proceedings insti-
tuted by landlords in superior court. 28 The judges of the superior 
18 Acts of I 953, c. 434. 
19 Acts of 1953, c. 434 expired on Dec. 31, 1955. For a discussion of the provisions of 
c. 434, see § 19.1 at text at notes 46-58 supra. 
20 Acts of I 953, c. 434, § 4(c) provided that 40 per cent of the amount expended by a 
locality for the purposes of the rent control act would be reimbuJ-sed by the Common-
wealth. 
21 Acts of 1953, c. 434, § 2(b)(3). 
22 331 Mass. at 507, 120 N.E.2d at 391. 
23 Id. at 507-08, 120 N.E.2d at 392. 
24 Id. at 508-09, 120 N.E.2d at 392. 
25 Id. 
26 See § 19.1 at text at notes 64-98 supra. 
27 358 Mass. 686, 266 N.E.2d 876 (1971). 
28 Four cases were actually consolidated for this appeal. Three were class actions insti-
tuted on behalf of all landlords affected by local adoption of rent control legislation; 
they were Marshal House, Inc. v. Rent Control Bd. of Brookline (~hallenging c. 843 and 
town by-laws adopted thereunder); Aiello v. Rent Control Adm't of Cambridge (chal-
lenging c. 842); and Goldman v. Rent Control Bd. of Brooklin~ (also challenging the 
Brookline action, especially the fact that there was no owner-occujpied exemption under 
c. 843 as there was in c. 842). See text of§ 19.1 at text at note 7.$ supra. All three suits 
sought declaratory judgments as to the constitutionality of the aqt, as well as injunctive 
relief to restrain its implementation. The fourth suit, Carroll v. Rent Control Adm'r of 
Cambridge, was instituted by tenants challenging administrative decisions under the act. 
The Court found that the issues raised in Carroll had become moot. 358 Mass. at 708, 
266 N.E.2d at 890. 
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court reserved judgment and reported the cases to the Supreme Judi-
cial Court where they were consolidated for appeal.2 9 
The landlords first attacked the luxury-housing exemption. Chapter 
842, section 3(b)(7) of the Acts of 1970 allows a municipality which 
accepts the act to exempt from control those units for which the rent 
charges exceed limits set by the municipality, provided that no more 
than twenty-five per cent of the total rental units in the municipality 
are so exempted. The landlords made two divergent challenges to this 
optional exemption, both of which were grounded in a theory of an 
overly broad delegation by the legislature. On the one hand, since the 
state delegated to each locality the power to formulate its own defini-
tion of luxury housing,30 presumably a locality could exempt from 
control those accommodations at which the emergency legislation was 
aimed, i.e., non-luxury units, so long as no more than twenty-five per 
cent of all rental units were thus exempted. On the other hand, since 
the exemption provision is merely optional, a locality which chose not 
to exercise it would regulate housing units which had no rational con-
nection with the emergency the legislature sought to remedy; this 
failure to make the exemption mandatory, it was contended, consti-
tuted an abuse of the police power. 
The Court held that the statutory formula is aimed at providing 
each locality with the flexibility to adapt the luxury housing exemp-
tion to its own particular need. That the General Court might have 
devised a better formula so that no low or middle-income housing 
29 All suits had been originally instituted in the superior court. They were reserved 
and reported without decision to the Supreme Judicial Court by two superior court 
judges upon the pleadings, exhibits, and statements of agreed facts pursuant to G.L. c. 
231, § Ill. Before reaching the merits in Marshal House, the Court had to first decide 
several threshold issues. First, the original jurisdiction of the superior court was chal-
lenged on the ground that the rent control acts give the district court exclusive original 
jurisdiction over complaints filed by any person "aggrieved by any action, regulation or 
order of the board or administrator." Acts of 1970, c. 842, § IO(a). The Court held that 
the original jurisdiction of the district courts would obtain where a complaint involved 
the validity of a particular order issued under the act, but not where, as here, the con-
stitutionality of the entire statute was put in question. 358 Mass. at 692, 266 N.E.2d at 
881. Second, the Court found that the request for declaratory relief under G.L. c. 
23IA, § I, was a proper one since "(t]he pleadings demonstrate(d] a 'real dispute ... 
[and] the circumstances ... indicate that, unless a determination is had, subsequent 
litigation as to the identical subject matter will ensue.'" 358 Mass. at 692, 266 N.E.2d at 
881. Finally, an objection was raised by one of the defendants that the tenants affected 
by cc. 842 and 843 had a right to be notified of the pendency of the class action since 
rent control was enacted for their benefit and the rent control board could not ade-
quately represent their interest. The Court summarily rejected this assertion; it felt it 
absurd to require someone who challenged the constitutionality of a statute to name as 
defendants all those who might benefit under the act. 358 Mass. at 693, 266 N.E.2d at 
882. 
3° Cf. Acts of 1953, c. 434, § 2(b)(3)(iv), which provided for a mandatory exemption 
of all units which rented at more than $150 a month. 
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would fall within the exemption was not sufficient to strike down the 
exemption. So far as owners of luxury units which a locality chose not 
to exempt are concerned, their economic interests are afforded suffi-
cient safeguards in the form of judicial review of, all local decisions 
under the act. 31 
Plaintiffs then contended that the exemption fc)>r owner-occupied 
two and three-family dwellings32 violated the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment in that it was an unreasonable classifi-
cation as among landlords. The Court in response emphasized that 
the provision must be scrutinized in light of wheth¢r the classification 
it created bore a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legis-
lation. It then found several rational grounds which justified the ex-
emption. First, landlords who live with their tenants and see them 
daily are less likely to raise rents to an exorbitant level. Second, in 
light of the fact that preventing the deterioration of existing housing 
is an additional goal of the rent control laws, it is neasonable to expect 
that pride of ownership will sufficiently encourage, resident landlords 
to carefully maintain the premises. Finally, owner-occupiers are not 
"true" landlords whose predominant or exclusive: source of income 
derives from rentals, but rather are people letting out a portion of 
their homes not necessary for their daily living. 33 ~ 
The plaintiffs next argued that the limitation of the rent control op-
tion to all cities and only those towns whose pqpulation exceeded 
50,00034 violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Court disagreed 
and again found that the challenged classification bore a fair and sub-
stantial relation to the object of the legislation, since the provision was 
based upon a "supportable legislative finding of a housing emergency 
in areas of the Commonwealth as so limited."35 
Plaintiffs urged that the provision which required rents to be frozen 
initially at the level which existed six months prior to the date of the 
I 
31 358 Mass. at 694, 266 N.E.2d at 882. Judicial review of Iota! administrative action 
is provided for in Acts of 1970, c. 842, §§ 8, l 0. 
3• Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 3(b)(6). 
33 358 Mass. at 695-97, 266 N.E.2d at 882-85. Petitioners argued in the alternative 
that since c. 842 exempted owner-occupied two and three-family dwellings from control 
while Brookline's by-laws (Article XXX) passed pursuant to c. 843 did not recognize 
such an exemption, owner-occupiers in Brookline were deniedi the equal protection of 
the laws. See § 19.1 at text at notes 70-73 supra. Emphasizing that c. 843 enumerates 
the special needs of the Brookline housing emergency, the Court found that it did not 
amount to a denial of equal protection, since "any other city qr town is free to follow 
the same procedure in seeking legislation .... Should another municipality feel ... that 
c. 842 ... is not adequate for its needs in the area of rent cont~ol, the way is open for it 
to take the legislative avenue Brookline took. The result ... would be constitutionally 
immune from attack, for it would be a product of differing loc;Jtl needs and conditions." 
358 Mass. at 699, 266 N.E.2d at 885. 
34 Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 2. 
30 358 Mass. at 700, 266 N.E.2d at 885. 
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act's acceptance by the municipality36 violated both due process and 
equal protection in that it was an arbitrary cut-off point which bore 
no significant connection with any ascertainable rent increase. Under 
this mechanism, each locality could have a different date to which 
rents would be rolled back, depending upon the date on which it de-
cided to enact rent control. The Court disagreed, holding that such a 
rollback would safeguard against last-minute rent increases and would 
assure that rents were set "at levels which landlords and tenants have 
worked out for themselves by free bargaining in a competitive 
market."37 The fact that the exact rollback date might vary from city 
to city would not fatally affect the act's validity, since "[t]he effect ... 
is to empower municipalities to administer their own rent control ac-
cording to a mechanism which is carefully designed to insure fairness 
to both landlords and tenants."38 Finally, even if the initial freezing of 
rents worked a hardship upon a landlord, such a result could be easily 
remedied since an adjustment to insure a fair net operating income 
could be sought either .on the landlord's own petition39 or on the in-
itiative of the local rent board.40 
Lastly, plaintiffs argued that, since the term "fair net operating in-
come" was not defined in the statute, such a standard could in prac-
tice be confiscatory since it did not explicitly assure landlords a 
reasonable return on their investment. The Court disposed of this 
complaint by reading the term to require that rents be set at a level 
which would insure all landlords a reasonable return on their 
investment. 41 
§19.3. Housing exempted from control. Under the general 
enabling statute, chapter 842 of the Acts of 1970, a "rental unit or 
units in an owner-occupied two-family or three-family house" is ex-
empt from controJ.l In 1973 in Trovato v. Walsh, 2 the Supreme Judi-
cial Court was faced with the question of how broadly "owner-
occupied" was to be construed. Plaintiff-tenant appealed a final decree 
of the Middlesex Superior Court declaring certain premises to be 
owner-occupied. One of the defendants, Mrs. Walsh, had acquired 
and inhabited the two-family home in question in 1923 as a tenant by 
the entirety; she had continued to reside in the downstairs apartment 
ever since. In 1964, after her husband's death, Mrs. Walsh conveyed 
the property to her son without monetary consideration so that he 
36 Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 6(a). 
37 358 Mass. at 701, 266 N.E.2d at 886. 
3s 1d. at 702, 266 N.E.2d at 887. 
as Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 7(e). 
40 Id. § 8. 
41 358 Mass. at 703, 266 N.E.2d at 887. 
§ 19.3. 1 Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 3(b)(6). 
2 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 707, 295 N.E.2d 889. 
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would manage the property as "her agent;"3 he occupied the upper 
apartment until 1966. When Walsh departed, pla~ntiff entered the 
apartment as a tenant at will. Rental payments were made to the son. 
In September 1970, Walsh raised the monthly rental charge. Four 
months later, rent control went into effect in Somerville, and rents 
were to be rolled back to their June 1970 level. 4 Subsequently, Walsh 
was notified by the Rent Control Board of Somerville that the prop-
erty would be subject to rent control so long as he held title to the 
building and was not an occupant of the premises.! In August 1971, 
plaintiff-tenant first became aware of the rent control laws, and he in-
formed Walsh that he intended to pay rent at the! lower rolled-back 
rate. Later that same month, Walsh reconveyed the premises to his 
mother. 
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the superior court's conclu-
sion that, since the son had taken only naked titl¢ to the property, 
without monetary consideration and with the expr~ss understanding 
that his mother was to retain beneficial ownership, the premises qual-
ified for the owner-occupied exemption. The Co4rt, citing Marshal 
House, Inc. v. Rent Control Board of Brookline, 5 concluded that the fac-
tors which led the legislature to treat owner-occtilpants differently 
from professional realtors indicate that the exemption must have been 
aimed at beneficial ownership rather than record <(>wnership. 6 It was 
the beneficial owner who was in daily contact with her tenants and 
would be accessible to tenants' complaints7 and who would be con-
cerned with the maintenance and upkeep of the property, since she, 
too, made her home in the rental premises.8 Furtper, the beneficial 
owner here was clearly not engaged in the rental b{lsiness. 9 Thus, the 
qualifications which allowed the exemption to accrue to owner-
occupants were present here with respect to Mrs. Walsh. 
Limited to its facts, the holding in Trovato appears well-considered. 
The record owner was the beneficial owner's son; he managed no 
other properties, and he was presumably responsive to the tenant's 
complaints as they were related to him by his mother. 10 Thus, the 
conventional tenant-landlord relationship did not exist, and under 
these circumstances, the arrangement did not serve 
1
to frustrate the in-
tent of the legislature.U 
3 Id., 295 N.E.2d at 900. 
4 See Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 6. 
5 358 Mass. 686, 266 N.E.2d 876 (1971). See §19.2 at text at n~tes 32-33 supra. 
6 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 709, 295 N.E.2d at 902, citing 358 Mass. at 694-96, 266 
N.E.2d at 883-85. 
7 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 710, 295 N.E.2d at 902. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 709, 295 N.E.2d at 902. 
11 Indeed, as the Court noted, to hold that record ownership was controlling would 
invite non-resident landlords to convey record ownership to a r~sident tenant in order 
to qualify for the exemption. Id. 
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Nevertheless, Trovato might well lay a foundation for abuses of the 
law. If Mrs. Walsh had transferred record ownership to a professional 
real estate agent instead of to a blood relative, it is doubtful whether 
the factors which led the legislature to create the owner-occupied ex-
emption would exist. An owner-occupant might, for example, enter 
into a contract with a rental agency to have the agency manage the 
property and become the owner of record; the landlord could enjoy 
the financial rewards of beneficial ownership, and the agency would 
be responsible for the collection of rents and for responding to the 
maintenance requests of the tenants. Under an arrangement such as 
this, the person charged with upkeep would not be a neighbor who is 
in daily contact with fellow tenants, nor would he be one who is 
moved to discharge his responsibilities with promptness and care out 
of a sense of pride of ownership and residence. 12 A rental agency 
could establish a lucrative business by contracting with owner-
occupants to take record ownership and collect rents in exchange for 
a monthly charge. The Supreme Judicial Court indicated in Trovato 
that it would not disapprove this abuse when it stated that "the statute 
does not distinguish between landlords or agents who are profession-
als and those who are amateurs."13 
One running controversy over the present rent control laws has 
been the extent to which the Commonwealth or any of its political 
subdivisions may regulate the rents of federally-financed housing pro-
jects. In 1971 the town of Brookline passed a by-law14 which placed 
under rent control buildings constructed under various Federal Hous-
ing Administration (FHA) programs.15 The by-law was effectively in-
validated by an opinion issued by the Massachusetts Attorney Gener-
al's office16 which held the Brookline action to be in conflict with the 
federal scheme of regulating rents in the housing projects which the 
federal government subsidizes and supervises. 17 Brookline is appeal-
ing the action of the Attorney General in a suit pending before the 
12 It must be remembered that the act is a response to "deterioration of a substantial 
portion of the existing housing stock." Acts of 1970, c. 842, § I. 
13 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 709, 295 N.E.2d at 902. 
14 The by-law was enacted pursuant to authority granted the town of Brookline by 
special enabling legislation permitting rent control. Acts of 1970, c. 843. 
15 The National Housing Act of 1937, §§ 207, 22l(d)(3)-(4), 231, 236, as amended, 
codified in 12 U.S.C. §§ 1713, 1715l(d)(3)-(4), 1715v, 1715z-l (1970). 
16 The Attorney General's power to invalidate local legislation derives from G.L. c. 
12, § 9. 
17 See letter from Carter Lee, Assistant Attorney General, to Thomas F. Larkin, 
Town Clerk of Brookline, Aug. 18, 1971. Mr. Lee characterized the town's action as an 
"attempt to superimpose local controls on housing already regulated and controlled by 
the federal government .... This appears to be in violation of the Supremacy Clause 
... , Congress having already occupied the field by adoption of the National Housing 
Act." 
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Supreme Judicial Court. 18 
A 1970 Boston ordinance extended rent control to certain types of 
FHA projects. 19 Out of this municipal action arose i the case of Druker 
v. Sullivan, 20 wherein the plaintiffs, owners and opfrators of the Cas-
tle Square development, which is financed under! §22l(d)(3) of the 
National Housing Act of 1937,21 petitioned the United States District 
Court for the District of Massachusetts to declare the ordinance in-
valid on the ground that it conflicted with the 
1
federal regulatory 
scheme. At issue in both Brookline and Boston isl whether the local 
municipal action, instituted under valid enabling i legislation, consti-
tutes an invasion into a field which the federal government intended 
to preempt by the use of its own rent-regulation apparatus. Since the 
issue is not yet resolved, an examination of Druker might serve to bet-
ter frame the issues. , 
The Castle Square project is subject to a mortgage which is insured 
by the federal government. In March 1968, the pJaintiffs contracted 
with an agent of the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to 
"make dwelling accommodations and services of the project available 
to occupants at charges not exceeding those established in accordance 
with a schedule approved by the commissioner."22 The regional FHA 
commissioner, acting as the Secretary's agent, was to be responsible 
for approving "a rental schedule that is necessary to compensate for 
any net increase ... in ... expenses over which owners have no effec-
tive control."23 Pursuant to the agreement, plaintiffs sought a rent in-
crease of $28 per month in May 1969. An increase of $22 per month 
was authorized; half of the increase was to take leffect in February 
1970, the other half in February 1971. However!, the Boston Rent 
Board informed the plaintiffs that the increase would not be given ef-
fect since they had failed to comply with the city's rent adjustment 
procedures. 
Plaintiffs urged that the federal government, through its contrac-
tual arrangements with FHA landlords, had the sole authority to reg-
ulate rents in federally-funded and supervised projects. Therefore, 
the Boston ordinance could not be applied to the Castle Square pro-
ject without violating the Supremacy Clause of the United States 
18 Town of Brookline v. Attorney General, Supreme Judiciallcourt No. 15,196. The 
case was heard by the full bench and by an order dated May 16j 1973, it was remanded 
to a single justice for further findings of fact. 
19 City of Boston Ordinances of 1970, c. 11, § 1(e). Those programs brought under 
control include§§ 207, 220, 221(d) (3) and 236 of the National Housing Act of 1937, as 
amended. See also Ordinances of 1972, c. 19. 
20 322 F. Supp. 1126 (D. Mass. 1971); 334 F. Supp. 861 (0. Mass. 1971), aff'd on 
other grounds, 458 F.2d 1272 (1st Cir. 1972). 
21 12 u.s.c. § 1715l(d)(3) (1970). 
22 322 F. Supp. at 1128 (D. Mass. 1971). 
23 1d. at 1129. 
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Constitution. 24 The court, doubting that the plaintiffs would ulti-
mately prevail on the merits,25 refused to grant injunctive relief. The 
test as to the merits of the plaintiffs' complaint, the court said, had 
been explicitly set out by the United States Supreme Court in Florida 
Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul:26 
The test of whether both federal and state regulations may oper-
ate, or the state regulation must give way, is whether both regula-
tions can be enforced without impairing federal superintendence 
of the field, not whether they are aimed at similar or different ob-
jectives .... [F]ederal regulation . . . should not be deemed 
preemptive of state regulatory power in the absence of persuasive 
reasons-either that the nature of the regulated subject matter 
permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistaka-
bly so ordained.27 
While conceding that the federal government has the authority to 
approve rent increases, the court nevertheless found neither a con-
gressional declaration of preemption nor a conflict between the two 
sets of regulations since the contract between the developers and the 
FHA called for rents to be set "at charges not exceeding those ... ap-
proved by the commissioner."28 Thus, the court found that "[t]here 
appears to be no necessary conflict with the Boston Ordinance, even if 
the Boston Rent Board were to establish a rent below the maximum 
permitted but not required by the regulatory agreement."29 
Despite the plaintiffs' argument that they would not be able to meet 
their debt service obligations to the FHA if their federally-approved 
rent increases were not given effect, the court also found no potential 
for irreparable harm. The court emphasized that the plaintiff land-
lords were merely remanded to the local rent adjustment procedure, 
which assures the landlord a "fair net operating income,"30 and that 
the statutory formula would require the local administrative unit to 
set rents at a level sufficient to meet any debt obligations as they 
might become due. 31 
Following the directive of the court, the plaintiffs petitioned the 
Boston Rent Board for a rent increase. Applying their own rent ad-
24 "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be- made in Pur-
suance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State 
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Con-
trary notwithstanding." U.S. Const. art. VI,§ 2. 
2 • 322 F. Supp. at 1129. 
26 373 U.S. 132 (1963). 
27 Id. at 142. 
28 322 F. Supp. at 1130. 
29 Id. 
30 See generally § 19.4 infra. 
31 322 F. Supp. at 1130. 
22
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1974 [1974], Art. 22
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1974/iss1/22
524 1974 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS lAW §19.3 
justment formula, the local board approved a tota~ rent increase of 
$16 per month, thus granting the plaintiffs a rent increase which was 
$6 less than the rent schedule approved by the federal administrator. 
Plaintiffs then returned to the district court and req~ested a summary 
judgment on the ground that the outcome of thei local adjustment 
hearing which reduced their federally-approved rent adjustment indi-
cated conclusively that the federal and state regullations conflicted 
irreconciliably.32 The court refused to grant summary judgment, stat-
ing that it could not as a matter of law find that thtj reduction in the 
rent increase would render the plaintiffs incapable i of meeting their 
debt obligations.33 Rather, the court felt that the pla~ntiffs would have 
to establish that the rent increase of only $16 (in&tead of $22) per 
month would not be sufficient for them to make their mortgage pay-
ments. 
The court also refused to grant the defendants ~ dismissal of the 
action since the denial of plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment 
was not a final adjudication of the plaintiffs' alleg<hion. Instead, the 
court felt that it would be proper to abstain until the plaintiffs had 
exhausted the remedies available under the state rent control provi-
sion for state judicial review of local rent board actions. 34 In other 
words, the local rent authority was required by state statute to adjust 
the landlord's rates to a level that would yield a fair! net operating in-
come; if the adjustment rendered the landlord incdpable of meeting 
the mortgage obligations, then the local board's action, having violated 
the state assurance of a fair return to the landlord, ~ould be reversed 
upon review by the state judiciary. "[N]ot only would such action run 
afoul of the Boston Rent Control Ordinance but would arguably vio-
late the special enabling act for Boston .... Whethet the action of the 
Boston Rent Board contravened ... State law ... is a matter particu-
larly suited to state court determination."35 Thus, the federal district 
court felt that it was proper to await a final state determination of the 
proper amount of rent increase before deciding whether the local 
regulations actually conflicted with the federal FHA scheme. 
Because of the abstention of the district court, further federal litiga-
tion awaits the outcome of the state court review of the rent board's 
action. It is submitted that no conflict need be fourtd; it is not a case 
where "the nature of the subject matter permits no! ... conclusion"36 
other than preemption. The federal regulations for the granting of 
rent adjustments require that consideration be givenl to the amount of 
32 Druker v. Sullivan, 334 F. Supp. 861 (D. Mass. 1971). 
33 Id. at 863. 
34 Id. at 864. 
35 Id. at 865. The decision was affirmed by the First Circuit. Druker v. Sullivan, 458 
F.2d 1272 (lst Cir. 1972). • 
36 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 h963). 
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rental income necessary to both maintain the economic soundness of a 
project and to provide a reasonable return on the original investment, 
consistent with the goal of providing reasonable rents to tenants.37 
Under the state enabling legislation, the landlord is assured that he 
will receive a fair net operating income, and that increased operating 
costs will be considered so that he may receive a reasonable return on 
his investment. 38 Thus, both the federal and local overseers will ad-
minister formulae to assure that the landlord will be compensated 
above his costs. 
The fact that both administrators will seek to ascertain the level of a 
fair return is not fatal. As Florida Lime indicates: 
[The Supreme] Court has ... sustained state statutes having ob-
jectives virtually identical to those of federal regulations, ... and 
has, on the other hand, struck down state statutes where the re-
spective purposes were quite dissimilar .... The test ... is whether 
both regulations can be enforced without impairing the federal 
superintendence of the field, not whether they are aimed at simi-
lar or different objectives. 39 
Since the contract between the FHA and the private entrepreneur 
stipulates that the federal administrator will set a rent ceiling, 40 a local 
determination of the allowable rent might be less than that set by the 
federal administrator and at the same time not violate the federal as-
surance to the landlord of a reasonable return. Any local adjustment 
which prevents the FHA landlord from meeting any of his operating 
costs or even from realizing a reasonable return will violate the state 
guarantee of a fair net operating income and will arguably be re-
versed in the course of state judicial review. Any local decision which 
interferes with the federal scheme will also run afoul of the state law. 
The two modes of regulation can accommodate each other. 
As a matter of pohcy, local review of rent increases granted by the 
federal authority appears desirable. Although the FHA is vested with 
the responsibility of seeing that the landlord's reasonable return is 
"consistent with providing reasonable rentals to tenants,"41 the First 
Circuit has decided that FHA tenants have no standing to assert their 
own interest during the federal rent adjustment procedure. 42 On the 
37 See 24 C.F.R. § 221.53l(c) (1974). 
38 See Acts of 1969, c. 797, as amended by Acts of 1970, cc. 863, 842, §§ 7(a),(b). 
39 373 U.S. at 142. 
40 See text at note 27 supra. 
41 24 C.F.R. § 221.53l(c). 
42 See Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243 (lst Cir. 1970). This case also involves the 
tenants and landlords of the Castle Square development. The tenants were denied the 
right to a hearing as to the $22 per month rent increase granted by the regional FHA 
administrator on the grounds that "[t]hese procedures would ... place a significant 
burden on the relationship between the landlord and the FHA .... Such procedures 
may delay economically necessary rent increases and discourage private investors from 
entering the program at all." Id. at 1248. 
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other hand, under the Massachusetts statutes the tenants have a right 
to a hearing in regard to the requested rent increas~.43 Given the ab-
seace of tenant representation throughout the federaJ rent adjustment 
procedure, the federal administrator might well loser sight of his duty 
to assure reasonable rents to tenants, and might not ~e made aware of 
decreases in the services supplied by the landlord. !He will be moti-
vated by the express and concededly legitimate purp<!>se of making the 
FHA project appear as lucrative as possible to po*ntial investors, 44 
but he will lose sight of another express and equally legitimate con-
gressional purpose-to supply inexpensive and ad~quate housing.45 
The Massachusetts statutory scheme, on the other~and, entitles the 
tenant to procedural and substantive safeguards hich will compel 
scrutiny not only of the landlord's increased opera ·ng expenses but 
also of decreases in the services he might have pr~mised to supply 
and deterioration which he might have promistd to remedy.46 
Further, the concern expressed as to the possible d~sincentive to pro-
spective private entrepreneurs caused by local revie~ of FHA rent ad-
justments is totally illusory, since all new constructiqn is exempted by 
statute from control. 47 ! 
It must be noted that the general enabling legislatipn would seem to 
preclude any of the other Massachusetts cities and I towns from con-
trolling rents in FHA housing, since it excludes frorr its definition of 
rental units subject to control those "units which a 1government unit, 
agency, or authority either owns or operates; or r~gulates the rents 
•••• "
48 However, this problem can be circumvented ~y seeking special 
enabling legislation such as Brookline did, which ext~nds the coverage 
of rent control to certain classes of rental units dxempt under the 
general enabl·ing legislation. 49 If such special legisla~ion is enacted, all 
that remains is the preemption question. , 
In a recent development subsequent to the end of the Survey year, 
the Department of Housing and Urban Developnilent (HUD), con-
cluding that local rent controls have become a significant factor in 
I 
i 
43 See Acts of 1969, c. 797, as amended by Acts of 1970, cc. 86t 842, §§ 7(a), (b). See 
also§ 19.4 at text at notes 1-7 infra. I 
44 See S. Rep. No. 281, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1961 ). I 
•• I d. It must also be noted that since the FHA is secondarily lia~le on the mortgages in 
such projects, they have a vested interest in keeping rents as high las possible in order to 
protect their own secondary liability on the mortgages. It is at !best dubious whether 
such a concern is valid in light of the ultimate goal of the FHA, i!'e., to provide housing 
for the poor. It is submitted that the only method for insuring th t this ultimate goal be 
kept in mind is to allow tenants a forum at the local level for he protection of their 
own interest. 
48 See Acts of 1969, c. 797, as amended by Acts of 1970, cc. 86 , 842, §§ 7(a), (b). 
47 Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 3(b)(2). I 
•• ld. §§ 3(b)(3)(i), (ii). . 
•• See Acts of 1970, c. 843. See also § 19.1 at notes 69-70 supra!· 
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causing defaults by landlords with federally-insured mortgages,50 
promulgated interim rules which attempt to remove from local con-
trol those units whose inclusion in a state regulatory scheme makes it 
impossible, as HUD perceives it, for the owner to maintain the build-
ing and also meet his mortgage obligations. 51 On their face, the new 
federal regulations will not invalidate local rent supervision since, 
under the Massachusetts enabling legislation, the landlord is entitled 
to sufficient rental income to meet mortgage requirements and, in 
addition, to receive a reasonable return on his investment. It seems, 
however, that the agency decision will have a more far-reaching effect 
in that it will lend support to those who argue that the federal gov-
ernment intended to preempt the regulatory field in this area. 
Boston has already instituted a court challenge to this ruling. 52 The 
technical aspects of its argument will be altered, however. While pre-
viously resting its position on the absence of any congressional expres-
sion of an intention to preempt, the city will now be compelled to 
demonstrate that HUD has exceeded the scope of its delegated au-
thority by promulgating this declaration of federal preemption. 
§19.4. Rent adjustments. Procedure. As mentioned above/ the 
landlord who seeks an individual upward adjustment of rent or the 
tenant who seeks to reduce the monthly rental rate in a controlled 
unit must petition the local board or administrator. 2 Notice must be 
given to the adverse party, who has the right to a hearing3 wherein 
the moving party can be required to establish the necessity of an ad-
justment by producing relevant books, records, receipts, and similar 
evidence.4 The statute empowers the local rent board "to compel the 
attendance of ... witnesses and the giving of testimony" by applica-
so See 40 Fed. Reg. 8189 (1975). 
51 See 40 Fed. Reg. 8189-90 (1975). These interim rules became finalized on April 
25, 1975. 
52 See N.Y. Times, March 28, 1975, at 48, col. 5. 
§ 19.4. 1 See § 19.1 at text at note 85 supra. 
2 Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 8(a). It should be recalled that § 8(b) allows the local board 
to grant an across-the-board percentage increase in maximum rent for any class of con-
trolled units in the city or town. This is called a "general adjustment." The statute re-
quires that public notice of the proposed general adjustment be given through at least 
three newspaper publications, and that a public hearing be held before the adjustment 
is effected. ld. 
3 Id. § 8(a). 
4 Id. § 5(d), which reads in pertinent part: 
The board or administrator may ... conduct such hearings, and obtain such in-
formation as it deems necessary in ... administering and enforcing this act .... 
For the foregoing purposes, a person may be summoned to attend and testify and 
to produce books and papers .... Any person who rents or offers for rent ... 
may be required to furnish under oath any information required by the board or 
administrator, and to produce records and other documents and make reports. 
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tion for subpoenas to the Supreme Judicial Court or to the superior 
or district courts.5 
The conduct of the hearing is regulated by the requirements inci-
dent to the adjudicatory proceedings of agencies. 6 Thus, rules of 
privilege will be recognized, reasonably reliable eviidence will be re-
quired, cross-examination and rebuttal will be per~itted, and an offi-
cial record of the hearing will be made. 7 The purpose of the hearing 
is to determine whether changes in costs or other conditions require 
that the rental charges be adjusted. 
The exact procedure for rent adjustment hearilljgs is not fixed by 
the statute. However, in Nayor v. Rent Board of Town of Brookline, 8 
decided under an earlier Massachusetts rent control statute,9 a tenant 
challenged the granting of a rent increase to hi~ landlord on the 
ground that the board had failed to consider wh¢ther the landlord 
was already receiving a fair net operating income fmm the rental rate 
which existed prior to his petition for an upw~rd adjustment. 10 
Plaintiff's counsel opposed the board's use of the s~atu tory formula, 11 
and he requested that it allow him to summons a representative of the 
landlord in order to examine him as to the existen1ce of a reasonable 
return before the landlord was allowed to offer prQof as to the neces-
sity of an increase. The board refused and, applying its own formula, 
granted the landlord an increase. · 
The tenant exercised his right to judicial review ·I Although the Su-
preme Judicial Court dismissed the case on the grqunds of mootness 
because of the expiration of the statute, the court indicated that it did 
not feel that the statute "made mandatory a determfnation of whether 
or not any petitioning landlord was receiving ren~ adequate to pro-
duce fair net operating income as a condition precedent to permitting 
any increase."12 ' 
This dictum works a serious disadvantage to ten<l,nts. The statutory 
formula for rent adjustment, although ostensibly requiring a determi-
nation of a fair net operating income, merely orde11s the local author-
ity to consider changes in the expenses incurred' and services ren-
dered by the landlord. 13 Thus, a landlord might m1erely produce rec-
5 Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 5(d) expressly incorporates G.L. c. 21\3, § 10 (giving the Su-
preme Judicial Court and the superior court subpoena power) into the rent control 
scheme. The former provision also vests the district courts with i the identical subpoena 
power given to the Supreme Judicial Court and superior courts ~y G.L. c. 233, § 10. 
6 Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 8(d). See G.L. c. 30A, §§ 11(1)-(6). 
7 G.L. c. 30A, §§ 11(1)-(6). 
8 334 Mass. 132, 134 N.E.2d 419 (1956). 
9 Acts of 1953, c. 434, § 5. 
10 334 Mass. at 133, 134 N.E.2d at 421. 
11 The factors ostensibly applied were similar to the six stat~tory factors found in 
Acts of 1970, c. 842, §§ 7(b)(1)-(6). · 
12 334 Mass. at 136, 134 N.E.2d at 422. 
13 See text at notes 14-16 infra. 
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ords of increased expenses and be granted a rent increase, without 
any scrutiny as to whether he was receiving a fair net operating in-
come prior to his petition. The rental income which he was receiving 
at the initiation of rent control will therefore escape examination. 
Substantive standards for rent adjustments. Adjustments in rental levels 
are to be determined so as to yield the landlord a fair net operating 
income. The general enabling act directs that six factors, "among 
other relevant factors,"14 shall be considered in the determination of 
whether the rental level should be increased. They include: (I) 
changes in property taxes; (2) unavoidable increases, or any decreases, 
in operating expenses; (3) capital improvements; (4) increases or de-
creases in living space, services, furniture or furnishings; (5) substan-
tial deterioration of the rental unit aside from ordinary wear and tear; 
and (6) failure to perform ordinary repair, maintenance, and 
replacement. 15 The statute does not clearly indicate how much weight 
is to be accorded to each of these factors, nor does it define in explicit 
terms "fair net operating income."16 
In 1971 in Marshal House, Inc. v. Rent Control Board of Brookline 17 the 
Supreme Judicial Court expressed its understanding that a fair net 
operating income includes not only reimbursement for the expenses 
of and services rendered by a landlord, but also a reasonable return 
on the landlord's investment. The Court felt that a parallel could be 
drawn to the statutory standard of "adequate, just, [and] reasonable"18 
rates for insurance premiums, which had been interpreted as requir-
ing premium levels to be set at the midpoint between the lowest rate 
which is not confiscatory and the highest rate which is not excessive or 
extortionate. 19 The Court refused to specify what percentage return 
would constitute a "reasonable" return on the landlord's investment, 
14 Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 7(b). 
15 Id. Although the statute does not so indicate, it would seem that the duty implied 
by the sixth factor would accrue to the tenant, and that failure to perform would oper-
ate in favor of a landlord's request for a rent increase. 
16 The Brookline enabling statute defines fair net operating income as: 
[T)hat income which will yield a return, after all reasonable operating expenses, on 
the fair market value of the property equal to the debt service rate generally avail-
able from institutional first mortgage lenders or such other rate of return as the 
board, on the basis of the evidence presented before it, deems more appropriate to 
the circumstances of the case. The fair market value of the property shall be the 
assessed valuation of the property or such other valuation as the board ... deems 
more appropriate to the circumstances of the case. 
Acts of 1970, c. 843, § 3. There is no similar language in the general enabling statute; 
furthermore, the Brookline language cannot be read into the general statute since it is 
clear that the Brookline statute is a special one enacted in response to Brookline's own 
particular needs. 
17 358 Mass. 686, 266 N.E.2d 876 (1971). See§ 19.2 at text at notes 27-41 supra. 
18 See G.L. c. 175, § 113B. 
19 358 Mass. at 704, 266 N.E.2d at 888, citing Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. 
Commissioner of Ins., 329 Mass. 265,270, 170 N.E.2d 807,811 (1952). 
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since it felt that a rigid standard "which did not empower the local au-
thority to deal with the changing needs of the lbcality as they de-
veloped might well only aggravate the conditions [the rent control 
laws were] designed to alleviate."20 
This broad grant of discretion to local rent boards has resulted in 
some controversy. In Cambridge, a rent control administrator, in al-
lowing an eight to twelve per cent return on a lam:llord's investment, 
measured the investment by the current market value of the control-
led property rather than by its initial cost to th¢ landlord. Such a 
measure produces windfall profits for landlords for two important 
reasons. First, current market value reflects the s~ortage of low and 
middle-income residential housing. To use market value as the base 
not only allows landlords to profit from the dearth of rental units but 
also frustrates the purpose of the act, i.e., to inctiease the supply of 
such housing. It would provide a disincentive to increase housing 
supply, since a consequence of such an increase \fould be the defla-
tion of the value of existing housing. Second, the use of market value 
fails to consider the fact that many landlords hdlding multiple-unit 
properties own twenty per cent or less of the equity in such property. 
To base their rate of return on market value wou~d offer them a re-
turn far in excess of the money which they have at risk in such an en-
terprise. Also, it would encourage speculation in the housing market 
and short-term ownership of rental property-dearly counter-
productive to the goals of the act. It is submitted tlpt a formula which 
takes into account only the actual investment of th¢ landlord would be 
more consistent with the purposes of the rent control legislation. 
The Cambridge formula was eventually challen*ed in district court 
by dissatisfied tenants.21 The formula was voided for two reasons. 
First, the Cambridge administrator had merely s~t guidelines which 
were not sufficiently exact; they did not satisfy the statutory require-
ment that there be "relevant factors which the Administrator has by 
regulation defined"22 available for the determination of the landlord's 
reasonable return. Second, the court properly reo;>gnized that market 
value was not the correct starting point for a determination of the 
reasonableness of the landlord's return. It agreed that current market 
value of residential property is usually higher ~han the landlord's 
purchase price since the value of such property increases as the short-
age of rental housing becomes more acute. To $-easure a landlord's 
"reasonable return" on the basis of such an inflated value would per-
mit a landlord to profit from the present housing shortage in a way 
inimical to the purpose of the act. Thus, fair n¢t operating income 
20 358 Mass. at 705. 266 N.E.2d at 889. 
21 Ackerman v. Corkery, Equity No. 17 of 1971 (Middlesex Oist. Ct., March 2, 1972) 
(slip opinion). 
22 !d. at 5. For the statutory language, see Acts of I 970, c. 842, § 7(b). 
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should be based upon operating expenses as they relate to the 
landlord's initial investment in the property, and not to the current 
market value of the property.23 
At approximately the same time that the district court rendered its 
decision, a judge of the Middlesex Superior Court continued a re-
straining order enjoining the successor Cambridge Rent Control Ad-
ministrator from voiding rent adjustments made pursuant to the 
challenged formula. 24 The Supreme Judicial Court, in resolving the 
inconsistency, found that the conclusions of the district court (in-
validating the use of market value as the base) were in accordance 
with both the statutory purpose and the Marshal House opinion and 
therefore dissolved the restraining order issued by the superior 
court. 25 
Cambridge has instituted a system whereby an amount equal to the 
net receipts of the landlord from his rental property in 1967 is used 
as a starting point and is increased by a profit inflater similar to a cost 
of living increase. 26 The landlord is thus assured that his rental in-
come will maintain a constant real value. Such maintenance of the 
landlord's purchasing power is apparently not required by law27 and 
is questionable on policy grounds: it forces the tenant to bear the en-
tire cost of inflation. 
The rent adjustment method employed by the city of Boston28 ap-
pears to be more equitable. It creates a rebuttable presumption that 
the rents received by the landlord in December 1971 yielded him a 
fair net operating income at that time. 29 Adjustments are then made 
in accordance with the six statutory factors. 3° Finally, further amounts 
are added or subtracted "as may be necessary to avoid gross inequity 
and extreme hardship to the landlord or to the tenants .... "31 Under 
23 Ackerman v. Corkery, Equity No. 17 of 1971 (Middlesex Dist. Ct., March 2, 1972) 
(slip opinion), at 7. 
24 Gifford v. Healy, Docket No. 33159 (Middlesex Super. Ct. 1972). 
2
" Rent Control Bd. of Cambridge v. Gifford, 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1342, 285 N.E.2d 
449. 
26 Cambridge Rent Control Board Regulations 72-0 I (1972). 
27 It should be noted that in Spaeth v. Brown, 137 F.2d 669 (Emer. Ct. App. 1943), 
claimant landlord argued that the Price Administrator's formula for fixing maximum 
rents under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, § 2(b), 50 U.S.C. § 902(b) (ap-
pendix 1942), was invalid because it did not take into account the reduction of the 
landlord's purchasing power due to inflation. In rejecting that contention, the court held 
that "[t]o increase rents in order to maintain a landlord's purchasing power might well 
result ... in the impairment of the standard of living and purchasing power of large 
numbers of consumers and wage earners having an equal claim to protection." 137 F.2d 
at 671. The new Cambridge formula is being challenged in Twomey v. Lefkowitz in 
Middlesex Superior Court. 
2
" See Boston Rent Regulations § 6 (Feb. I, 1974). 
29 Id. § 4. 
30 Id. For a list of the statutory factors, see text at note 15 supra. 
31 Boston Rent Regulations§ 4(i) (Feb. I, 1974). 
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this formula, it appears that landlords will not automatically receive 
an upward adjustment simply because the value of the dollar has 
decreased. 32 Moreover, the pre-rent control rental charge will not au-
tomatically escape scrutiny by being utilized as the rigid starting point 
for the determination of fair net operating income. 
The built-in flexibility of the rent control statutes, which allows local 
authorities to define fair net operating income in light of local needs 
and circumstances, is a desirable feature. But in implementing its goal 
of flexibility, the legislature has been unnecessarily· vague and has left 
local rent boards without any direction at all. The controversy over 
how to measure "investment" is an example of the injustices which in-
evitably result from such a statutory void. One solution might be to 
have the legislature draw up several different formulae for determin-
ing fair net operating income. A local board could then choose to use 
the formula most suited to its needs and circt1mstances. Such a 
scheme would allow for flexibility within legislatively defined limits of 
fairness to both landlords and tenants.33 
§ 19.5. Issuance of certificate of eviction. Procedural aspects. 
Under the general enabling act, no action for recovery of a controlled 
rental unit can be initiated unless the landlord has obtained a certifi-
cate of eviction from the local rent control authority; 1 criminal sanc-
tions may be applied against any landlord who seeks to recover pos-
session without such certification.2 Upon receipt of the landlord's ap-
plication for a certificate, the rent control administrator notifies the 
tenant. 3 If the tenant wishes to oppose the application, he is usually 
required to file information in support of his posit~on. 4 Most localities 
provide for a hearing at which the landlord must produce evidence to 
justify his claim that the certificate should issue. 5 Such a hearing, 
32 Section 8(b) of chapter 842 of the Acts of 1970, the gener~1 enabling act, provides 
for downward adjustments where the landlord is making more than a fair net operating 
income. In this regard, two of the factors listed in § 7 are generally influential: (1) de-
crease in living space, services, furniture, furnishings, and equlpment, and (2) substan-
tial deterioration other than ordinary wear and tear. (Arguably, failure to perform or-
dinary repair, replacement, and maintenance is a duty which accrues to the tenant. See 
note 15 supra). The town of Brookline has come up with an imaginative implementing 
procedure for this last factor: the rent control board will grant rent decreases within 
thirty days after code violations are certified to exist. The redttction is twenty per cent 
of rental price if such violations are "serious" and ten per cent ir not. 
33 For several suggested formulae to determine fair net operating income, see The 
Community Research and Publications Group, Less Rent More Control: A Tenants' 
Guide to Rent Control in Massachusetts 57-76 (1973). 
§19.5. 1 Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 9. See§ 19.2 supra at notes 89-91. 
2 Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 9(d). For a discussion of sanctions, see § 19.1 at note 95 
supra. 
3 Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 9(b). 
4 See, e.g., Boston Eviction Regulations § 10 (1974). 
• Boston gives the Rent Control Administrator discretion to order a hearing notwith-
standing the tenant's failure to so request. Id. § 12. 
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however, is not expressly required by the statute. 
In Gentile v. Rent Control Board of Somerville, 6 decided during the 
Survey year, an aggrieved tenant made two claims: first, that the rent 
control laws impliedly grant a tenant a right to an adversary hearing 
on a landlord's application for a certificate of eviction; and second, 
that even if such an implication could not be read into the statute, no-
tions of due process require that such a hearing be granted. The local 
board, after receiving an application for a certificate from a landlord, 
had notified the tenant. The tenant opposed the application and filed 
supporting documents. The landlord then filed additional informa-
tion with the board. Without allowing the tenant an opportunity to re-
spond to this supplemental information, the board granted the certifi-
cate. No hearing was conducted, and the board failed to issue either a 
statement of reasons or findings of fact to explain its. decision. The 
landlord thereupon commenced a summary process action in the 
Somerville District Court; at the same time, the tenant initiated a suit 
in district court to have the board's decision set aside on the ground 
that he had been deprived of his right to a trial-like adversary pro-
ceeding. In the tenant's suit, the district court found for the board, 
and upon tenant's appeal, the superior court affirmed. The tenant 
thereupon appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court, which rejected his 
claims for two reasons. First, the Court pointed out that, since the 
statute expressly provided for an adversary proceeding with respect to 
a landlord's petition for a rent adjustment, 7 the absence of such a 
provision in the section relating to eviction procedures indicated that 
the legislature did not intend to encumber the certificate of eviction 
process with the trappings of a formal trial. 8 Second, while not con-
ceding that the tenant had any constitutional ground for his claim to 
an adversary proceeding, the Court concluded that any such require-
ment would be fulfilled by the statutory provision for a hearing in the 
course of judicial review of the board's action. 9 The act provides that 
a district court, in reviewing a decision of the rent board, may act in 
the same manner that a superior court does in reviewing proceedings 
originally brought in a district court under the provisions of chapter 
231A of the General Laws. 10 This means that any question of fact in 
dispute which was resolved by the board without an adversary pro-
ceeding may be determined by the district court as if the board had 
made no finding of fact. Therefore, the Court reasoned, whatever 
procedural rights belong to a tenant are adequately safeguarded 
through this scheme of review. 
8 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 809, 312 N.E.2d 210. 
7 See Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 8. See§ 19.4 at text at notes 4-7 supra. 
8 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 814,312 N.E.2d at 215. 
9 Id. 
10 Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 10. 
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It is clear that the rent control statutes grant both tenants and land-
lords a right to appeal a board decision to the district court which has 
territorial jurisdiction over the locus of the controlled rental unit. 11 
The statute does not make clear, however, whether an appeal from a 
district court review of a board decision is to be lodged in the 
superior court or in the appellate division of the district courts. This 
question of forum was raised during the Survey year in Freedman v. 
Rent Control Administrator of Cambridge. 12 Plaintiff-tenant commenced 
an action in district court to set aside the action of the administrator 
in granting a certificate of eviction. After an adverse determination by 
the district court, the tenant filed a claim of appeal in the superior 
court which incorporated a claim for a de novo jury trial. The land-
lord, who was joined with the rent administrator as a co-defendant, 
moved to dismiss on the grounds that the appeal was improperly be-
fore the superior court. The court denied the motion and reported its 
decision to the Supreme Judicial Court pursuant to: chapter 231, sec-
tion Ill of the General Laws. The Court then transferred the matter 
to the Appeals Court pursuant to chapter 211A, section 12 of the 
General Laws. The Appeals Court rejected the landlord's contention 
that the appellate division of the district courts was the proper forum 
for the appeal. The court based its decision on th~ language of the 
enabling statute, which provides, first, that all orders and judgments 
of the district court may be appealed in a manner provided in the 
case of a civil action in that district court13 and, second, that the dis-
trict court having territorial jurisdiction over the area in which the 
controlled rental unit is located shall have exclusive original jurisdic-
tion over all actions brought under the rent contJ1ol statute. 14 Since 
the district court had exclusive original jurisdiction, the defendant 
could not have removed the matter to the superior court; where the 
action cannot be brought originally in the superior court and the par-
ties have no election as to forum, an appeal must go to the superior 
court rather than to the appellate division of th¢ district courts. 15 
Thus, the second level of review is in the superior courts. 
If the question of whether a certificate of eviction was properly is-
sued is ultimately determined in favor of the landlord, he may initiate 
a summary process action to recover possession. Tris, in turn, raises 
the question of whether the tenant has a right to defend the summary 
process action by alleging that none of the statutory grounds for the 
11 Id. In Boston, the Boston Housing Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the dis-
trict court to review determinations of the rent administrator. St1e Acts of 1969, c. 797, 
as amended by Acts of 1970, c. 843, § I. 
12 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 46I, 298 N.E.2d 868 (rescriptiopinion). 
13 Acts of 1970, c. 842, § IO(a). 
14 Id. § IO(b). 
15 See G.L. c. 231, § 97. See also Mancini v. Columbus Auto Body, Inc., 359 Mass. 
586, 270 N .E.2d 399 (197 I). 
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issuance of the certificate of eviction were present. The Gentile Court 
commented on this problem in dictum. The Court concluded that 
since the enabling act provides for judicial review of a rent control 
administrator's finding with respect to the existence of adequate 
grounds for the issuance of a certificate, the legislature must have in-
tended that all questions arising out of that determination are to be 
resolved in the tenant's appeal against the board. 16 Therefore, the 
grounds for the certificate of eviction are not to be placed in issue in 
a summary process action. 17 
In light of the express statutory language, the Supreme Judicial 
Court was no doubt correct in concluding that the legislature did not 
intend to provide for an adversary hearing at the local rent board 
level. Nevertheless, when read in this manner the law does not afford 
the tenant adequate protection. It has been the observation of this 
writer that some district court judges, when supposedly resolving is-
sues of fact as if the rent board had made no determination of them, 
often attach great weight to the granting of the certificate; it is as if 
the tenant is confronted with an almost irrebuttable presumption of 
the validity of the board's action. Coupled with the Gentile dictum as 
to the conclusiveness of the judicial review of the board's action for 
the purposes of summary process, the original decision of the board 
takes on great significance, and any hasty or unfair determination by 
the local board can serve effectively to deprive the tenant of any op-
portunity to assert a valid defense. It is therefore submitted that the 
legislature should extend to the certificate of eviction proceedings the 
identical procedural niceties that are available to applications for rent 
adjustments. 
Substantive grounds for the issuance if the certificate: late payment of 
rent. 18 In Gentile, the plaintiff-tenant had argued that the certificate of 
eviction, which apparently had been granted on grounds of non-
payment of rent, 19 did not satisfy the statutory criteria for what con-
stitutes non-payment. 20 The landlord had stated in his application for 
the certificate of eviction that the tenant had always been behind in 
his rent, which became due on the first day of each month. The ten-
ant, in his written response, claimed that the landlord had agreed to 
accept late payments, which were a consequence of the tenant's hos-
16 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 816, 312 N.E.2d at 216. 
17 The Court also indicated by way of a footnote that if a complaint is filed pursuant 
to G.L. c. 842, § lO(a), challenging the issuance of the certificate, in many instances that 
complaint and the summary process action may be consolidated for trial. 1974 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. at 816 n.7, 312 N.E.2d at 216 n.7. 
18 For the full list of the statutory grounds for eviction certificate issuance, see § 19.1 
at note 90 supra. 
19 Since the board is not required to make a record of its deliberations, see text at 
notes 6-10 supra, one can only speculate as to upon which of the statutory grounds a 
certificate is issued. 
20 Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 9(a)(l). 
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pita1ization and inability to work. The landlord depied the existence 
of any such agreement, however, and stated that his monthly mort-
gage obligation to the bank precluded any such ~rrangement. The 
landlprd also submitted a schedule which demoljlstrated that rent 
payments had been late in every month from February 1970 until 
May 1971. Moreover, the landlord indicated that he had previously 
sent the tenant an eviction notice in September 19ro which was sub-
sequently withdrawn upon receipt of tenant's la'te payment. The 
tenant's sole substantive defense was that late payment is not a statu-
tory ground for eviction; since his rent was paid lilP at the time the 
landlord applied for the certificate of eviction, thette was no justifica-
tion for its issuance. 
The Supreme Judicial Court refused to pass on the question of 
whether repeated late payment of rent falls within the statutory 
ground of non-payment. Instead, the Court found ample ground for 
issuance of the certificate in the "catch-all" provision of the section on 
evictions, which allows the granting of a certificate '\fhen "the landlord 
seeks to recover possession for any just cause [ot~er than the nine 
specified grounds for eviction], providing that his i purpose is not in 
conflict with the provisions and purposes of this jact."21 The Court 
reasoned that the term "conflict" is addressed to 1 a disharmony be-
tween the landlord's purpose in seeking the eviction and the "provi-
sions and purposes of this act."22 The Court concl~ded that no such 
conflict existed since there was no indication th'* the eviction was 
aimed at removing the unit from the rolls of contn~lled rental units. 23 
The Court rejected a reading of the statute that would interpret "con-
flicts" as referring to a disharmony between "an~ other just cause" 
and the nine speCified grounds for eviction. Sud) a reading of the 
statute most likely would preclude chronic late p<,tyment as grounds 
for eviction since it would, as the tenant insiste~, conflict with the 
statutory provision for issuance of the certificate fbr non-payment of 
rent.24 : 
However, the Court did suggest that, in certain !circumstances, late 
payment would not justify the issuance of a cer~ificate. The Court 
drew a parallel to the Massachusetts statute which :tllows the tenant to 
bar a landlord's recovery of possession by curin$ the non-payment 
within five days of receipt of notice to quit. 25 ' 
21 I d. § 9(a)( 1 0). 
22 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 813, 312 N.E.2d at 214. 
23 Id. 
24 See Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 9(a)(1). 
25 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 814 n.5, 312 N.E.2d at 214 n.5. Tht statute relied upon by 
the Court is G.L. c. 186, § 2. Since the statute carves out an exc~ption where the tenant 
has received a similar notice to quit based upon non-payment of! rent within the preced-
ing twelve months, the Court felt that the parallel was not applicable here; the landlord 
had previously applied for a certificate of eviction under § 9(a)(10) which he withdrew 
after tender of payment by the tenant. 
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Substantive grounds: renovation of rental units. In Mayo v. Boston Rent 
Control Administrator,26 decided during the Survey year, the landlord, 
intending to make substantial renovations of the premises in question, 
argued that such renovations could be made only if the apartments 
were vacated. The administrator concluded that the landlord's stated 
purpose for seeking the evictions was a ')ust cause" that did not con-
flict with the purposes of the rent control laws,27 and thus issued the 
certificates. Tenants appealed the decision, and the Boston Housing 
Court reversed. 28 The Supreme Judicial Court, finding no error in 
the factual determinations or the application of law made by the hous-
ing court, affirmed that decision. The findings of the housing court 
emphasized the recital, contained in the preamble to the act, i.e., that 
the statute's enactment was a direct response to the "'substantial and 
increasing shortage of rental accommodations for families of low and 
moderate income.' "29 Since the record reflected that the proposed reno-
vation would increase the rental costs by at least $120 per month, and 
since such a price hike would permanently remove the units from the 
low and moderate-income rental market, the "result would be in con-
flict with what is clearly a central purpose of the act": 30 it would sub-
tract from the stock of low and moderate-income housing. Addition-
ally, the Court rejected the landlord's contention that evictions were 
required to make necessary minimal repairs, as opposed to optional 
upgrading of the units, in order to insure the continued suitability of 
the units for human habitation. The Court disagreed, concluding that 
necessary repairs could be performed without evictions. Moreover, if 
such repairs required extraordinary financial outlays, the landlord 
would be entitled to apply for an upward adjustment of his fair net 
operating income. Finally, although the Court conceded that its deci-
sion prevented the landlord from realizing his maximum potential 
profit, it found no constitutional infirmity in its result, since its deci-
sion was based upon a statute enacted pursuant to a legislatively-
recognized public emergency.31 
26 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1109, 314 N.E.2d 118. 
27 See Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 9(a)(IO); Acts of 1969, c. 797. 
28 Acts of 1969, c. 797 vests concurrent jurisdiction in the district courts and the Bos-
ton Housing Court. 
29 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1113,314 N.E.2d at 121, quoting Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 1 
(emphasis added by Court). 
30 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1114, 314 N.E.2d at 122. 
31 Chief Justice Tauro, in a vigorous dissent, questioned the constitutionality of the 
majority's decision, since it "allows the tenants to take from the landlord a substantial 
property interest, namely, the right to make substantial alterations on his property and 
to obtain correspondingly higher rents." ld. at 1120, 314 N.E.2d at 127 (dissenting 
opinion). 
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